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EMPOWERMENT LAWYERING: THE ROLE OF TRIAL 
PUBLICITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
Jennifer L. Johnson* 
We are talking about toilet training trans-national corporations .... We 
don't want our lands polluted, our water made unsafe to drink, and our 
air a cause of sickness and disease. Rich corporations who violate our 
citizens and our environment must be punished and they shall be.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, environmental harms have occurred most often in 
low-income communities and communities of color.2 Across the United 
States, communities and their attorneys battle against this unsettling 
tendency and for environmental justice. Environmental poverty law-
yetJ Luke Cole has suggested an approach to lawyering4 that has 
* Business Editor, 1995-1996, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
My thanks to Visiting Scholar Charlie Lord and Assistant Clinical Professor Paul Tremblay of 
Boston College Law School for their many helpful comments; to Attorney Macon Cowles for 
providing the fascinating case upon which this Comment is based; and to my mother for her 
constant support and encouragement. 
1 ASARCO Hit with Class Action Lawsuit, ENOS MILLS NEWS (The Denver Group for the 
Sierra Club, Denver, Colo.), Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 1 (Attorney Macon Cowles commenting on aim 
of his case). 
2 Charles P. Lord & William A. Shutkin, Environmental Justice and the Use of History, 22 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994). See generally Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal 
Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at Sl. 
3 Throughout this Comment, the term "environmental poverty lawyer" is used to describe an 
attorney who represents low-income communities-often communities of color-facing environ-
mental hazards. Luke W. Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View from the Field, 
90 MICH. L. REV. 1991, 1992 (1992). 
4 See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for 
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 661--82 (1992) [hereinafter Cole, Empow-
erment]. 
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received widespread acceptance as a method of solving environmental 
problems faced by low-income communities and communities of color.5 
The basic tenets of the type of lawyering Cole suggests are: "client 
empowerment; group representation; and law as a means, not an 
end."6 The gist of empowerment lawyering is that the community 
must speak for itself as much as possible.7 
This Comment suggests, however, that in order to empower the 
community successfully, the lawyer must be critically involved.8 In 
other words, the lawyer has a specific role to play in empowerment 
lawyering. That role, this Comment argues, requires publicity work.9 
Until now, environmental justice scholars have not focused on the 
potential impact of ethical trial publicity rules on empowerment law-
yering. This Comment analyzes the potential impact of these rules in 
the context of environmental justice cases and suggests that states 
adopt a provision similar to Model Rule 3.6 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (Model Rule 3.6), as amended in 1994 (1994 
Model Rule 3.6). Section II of this Comment provides an historical 
backdrop for the issue of trial publicity and explores the evolution of 
the ethical rules governing trial publicity leading to 1994 Model Rule 
3.6. Section III suggests that those states that remain governed either 
by Disciplinary Rule 7-107 of the Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility (DR 7-107) or Model Rule 3.6 adopt a provision similar to 1994 
Model Rule 3.6. Section III also compares 1994 Model Rule 3.6 with 
DR 7-107 and analyzes the constitutionality of DR 7-107, finding that 
DR 7-107, especially as applied in the civil setting, is unconstitutional. 
Finally, Section III examines the harmful effect the speech limitations 
of DR 7-107 have had in the environmental justice context. Section 
IV argues that 1994 Model Rule 3.6 protects fair trials without hin-
dering expression and thus permits environmental poverty lawyers 
to use this less restrictive rule to further the environmental justice 
movement. Finally, Section V summarizes and concludes that, with 
certain restrictions, attorney trial publicity can be a valuable part of 
environmental justice. 
5 Interview with Charles P. Lord, Visiting Scholar, Boston College Law School, and Co-Direc-
tor, Alternatives for Community and Environment, Inc., in Newton, Mass. (Mar. 24,1995). 
6 Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 661. 
7 Interview with Charles P. Lord, supra note 5; see Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 
661-68. 
8 See infra section IV. 
9 See infra section IV.A. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Constitutional Considerations of Trial Publicity 
Litigants have a constitutional right to have their dispute resolved 
on admissible evidence, by fair procedures, in a tribunal that is not 
influenced by public sentiment or outcry.lO The right to a fair trial is 
guaranteed to criminal defendants by the Sixth Amendmentll and to 
all persons by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.12 
Protection of that right requires some limits on the kinds of informa-
tion that can be disseminated to the public before trial-particularly 
where the trial is to be by jury.13 On the other hand, the public and 
the press have countervailing rights under the First Amendment.14 
The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and an 
interest in knowing about the conduct of judicial proceedings.15 More-
over, litigation often leads to debate over questions of public policy.16 
B. Historical Background of Trial Publicity Rules in Light of 
Constitutional Considerations 
Since 1908, the American Bar Association (ABA) has sought to 
balance the constitutional rights of the public and the press against 
the litigants' constitutional right to a fair trial by restricting extraju-
dicial statements made by lawyers.17 Since that time, the ABA has 
promulgated and promoted three standards regarding trial publicity: 
Canon 20 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (Canon 20), DR 7-107, 
10 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt. (1993). 
11 Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 
912 (1976). The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... " 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
12 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971). The Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments against the states. See, e.g., Duncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968). 
13 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt. (1993). 
14 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt. (1993). 
The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law ... 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
15 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt. (1993). 
16 [d. 
17 See id. 
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and Model Rule 3.6. These standards have served as the basis for the 
standards adopted by state bar agencies that license attorneys.18 
The ABA adopted the first standard, Canon 20, in 1908.19 According 
to Canon 20, statements made by lawyers regarding pending or an-
ticipated litigation, whether civil or criminal, generally were con-
demned.20 Although Canon 20 was in effect for sixty-one years, it was 
rarely enforced because courts considered it general and vague.21 
The 1960s were a time of ardent debate over the problems of fair 
trial and free press.22 The debate intensified in 1963, with the perva-
sive press coverage and publicity surrounding the assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy.23 The 1964 Warren Commission Report 
on the assassination of President Kennedy24 furthered the debate and 
18 Lloyd B. Snyder, Rhetoric, Evidence, and Bar Agency Restrictions on Speech by Attorneys, 
28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 357, 361 (1995). 
19 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 20 (1908). Canon 20 reads: 
Id. 
[n]ewspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may 
interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration 
of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a 
particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anony-
mously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the 
records and papers on file in the court; but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid 
any ex parte statement. 
20 See id. 
21 See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 1979) ("The trouble [with Canon 
20] was that the standards were so general and vague that they were exceedingly difficult to 
apply and did little to forewarn speakers for publication about what was proscribed and what 
was permitted."); ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N 
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR 
TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 81 (Tentative Draft Dec. 1966) (The general language of Canon 20 "fails 
to give adequate guidance and it is perhaps for this reason that it has not been enforced."). 
22 See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1067~8 (1991). 
23 See Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, Report of the Comm. on the Operation 
of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 395 (1968). The 
Committee stated: 
[t]he events surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963 
graphically illustrate the effect of pervasive news coverage and publicity on the right 
of a defendant to a trial by an impartial jury. Because of this pUblicity, the President's 
Commission felt, "it would have been a most difficult task to select an unprejudiced 
jury, either in Dallas or elsewhere." 
Id. (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, REPORT 
OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, at 238 (1964) 
[hereinafter WARREN COMM'N REPORT]). 
24 WARREN COMM'N REPORT, supra note 23, at 27. The Warren Commission Report asked 
that "representatives of the bar, law enforcement associations, and the news media work 
together to establish ethical standards concerning the collection and presentation of information 
to the public so that there will be no interference with pending criminal investigations, court 
proceedings, or the right of individuals to a fair trial." Id. 
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ultimately led to the adoption of Standards Relating to Fair Trial and 
Free Press by the ABA in 1968.25 These standards limited statements 
of lawyers that presented a "reasonable likelihood that such dissemi-
nation [would] interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the 
due administration of justice."26 
The 1966 United States Supreme Court decision in Sheppard v. 
Maxwell also influenced significantly the debate over fair trial and 
free press.27 In this landmark decision, the Court found that the del-
uge of pervasive and prejudicial publicity that accompanied Dr. Sam 
25 In December 1966, the ABA Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, under 
Justice Paul C. Reardon of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, released a tentative draft 
of its report. ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N 
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR 
TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 19 (Tentative Draft Dec. 1966). The draft was approved in 1968. 
ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON 
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND 
FREE PRESS (Approved Draft Feb. 1968) [hereinafter REARDON REPORT]. 
The Reardon Report did not recommend restraint on the press. Id. at 68-73. Instead, the 
Reardon Report recommended that the ABA impose restrictions on the release of information 
by lawyers and law enforcement officers. Id. at 76. 
Other reports that added to the debate on the fair trial and free press issue were noted in 
the Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair 
Trial" Issue. 45 F.R.D. 391, 397 (1968) (citing AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASS'N, 
FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (Jan. 1967); SPECIAL COMM. ON RADIO, TELEVISION AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREE-
DOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL: FINAL REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1967)). 
26 REARDON REPORT, supra note 25, § 1.1, at 2. 
27 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). In Sheppard, defendant Dr. Sam Sheppard was 
accused of bludgeoning his pregnant wife, Marilyn Sheppard, to death. See id. at 335. Before 
the trial, the Cleveland news media filled the area with stories about the case and Sheppard's 
personal problems. Id. at 338-42. Most of the stories focused on highly incriminating evidence. 
Id. at 340. Three months before the trial, the coroner called an inquest. Id. at 339. The three-day 
inquest was televised and conducted before an audience of several hundred. Id. Although 
Sheppard's counsel were present, they were not allowed to participate. Id. Several weeks before 
the trial, the names and addresses of prospective jurors were published, resulting in their 
receipt of telephone calls and letters about the case. Id. at 342. The trial court did nothing to 
limit the pretrial publicity. See id. at 338-42. 
Pervasive publicity continued during the trial. Id. at 342-49. Twenty reporters were allotted 
seats within the bar and other members of the press crowded the small courtroom, continually 
disrupting the trial. See id. at 342-44. Before deliberations, the jurors were not sequestered and 
were constantly exposed to the news media. Id. at 345. Although they were sequestered during 
their deliberations, the jury was given inadequately supervised access to telephones. See id. at 
349. The trial judge did nothing to limit the massive publicity except to make "suggestions" and 
"requests" that the jurors not expose themselves to comment about the case. See id. at 353. The 
trial terminated on December 21, 1954 with Dr. Sheppard's conviction of second-degree murder. 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37, 40 (S.D. Ohio 1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965), 
rev'd, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
Nearly ten years later on a writ of habeas corpus the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio found that Sheppard had been denied due process because of this 
prejudicial publicity and the total failure of the trial judge to protect the jury from its effects. 
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Sheppard's murder prosecution denied him a fair trial.28 The Court 
stated that, to secure a defendant's right to a fair trial, "extrajudicial 
statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which di-
vulged prejudicial matters" should be restricted.29 
Sheppard influenced the drafters of the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility, which superseded the Canons of Professional Ethics 
in 1969.30 DR 7-10731 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
See id. at 60. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed by a divided 
vote. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707, 709-10, 738 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
28 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of writ by the district 
court. [d. 
29 [d. at 361. In the penultimate paragraph of the majority opinion, Justice Clark also warned 
that trial judges must take steps to limit outside influences on juries. [d. at 362-63. "Neither 
prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers 
coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collabo-
ration between counsel and the press . . . is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary 
measures." [d. at 363. 
Sheppard did not, however, discuss the effect of the First Amendment on the trial court's 
power to regulate the speech of attorneys. Gannett Co., Inc. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 742 (Del.) 
("While Sheppard did not specifically involve a first amendment challenge, we nevertheless keep 
in mind its principles when extensive media activity threatens a party's fundamental right to a 
fair trial."), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990). 
30 STEVEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND 
STANDARDS 409 (1995). 
31 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1983). DR 7-107 provides: 
(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a criminal matter 
shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable 
person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that 
does more than state without elaboration: 
(1) Information contained in a public record. 
(2) That the investigation is in progress. 
(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description of the offense and, 
if permitted by law, the identity of the victim. 
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance in other 
matters and the information necessary thereto. 
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers. 
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter 
shall not, from the time of the filing of a complaint, information, or indictment, the 
issuance of an arrest warrant, or arrest until the commencement of the trial or dispo-
sition without trial, make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a 
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication 
and that relates to: 
(1) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including arrests, indict-
ments, or other charges of crime) of the accused. 
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a lesser offense. 
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by 
the accused or his refusal or failure to make a statement. 
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure 
of the accused to submit to examinations or tests. 
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness. 
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ity incorporated the 1968 ABA Standards Relating to Fair Trial and 
Free Press governing public statements by lawyers in criminal 
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the evidence, or the 
merits of the case. 
(C) DR 7-107(B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from announcing: 
(1) The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the accused. 
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, any information necessary to aid in 
his apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he may present. 
(3) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence. 
(4) The identity of the victim of the crime. 
(5) The fact, time, and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of weapons. 
(6) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length 
of the investigation. 
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence seized, other than 
a confession, admission, or statement. 
(8) The nature, substance, or text of the charge. 
(9) Quotations from or references to public records of the court in the case. 
(10) The scheduling or result of any step in the judicial proceedings. 
(11) That accused denies the charges made against him. 
(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a lawyer or law firm 
associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter shall not make or 
participate in making an extra-judicial statement that a reasonable person would 
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to the 
trial, parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably likely to 
interfere with a fair trial, except that he may quote from or refer without comment to 
public records of the court in the case. 
(E) After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a criminal matter and 
prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution 
or defense shall not make or participate in making an extra-judicial statement that a 
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by public communication and that 
is reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence. 
(F) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 also apply to professional disciplinary pro-
ceedings and juvenile disciplinary proceedings when pertinent and consistent with 
other law applicable to such proceedings. 
(G) A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not during its investigation 
or litigation make or participate in making an extra-judicial statement, other than a 
quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable person would expect 
to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to: 
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved. 
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or prospective 
witness. 
(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure 
of a party to submit to such. 
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party, except as 
required by law or administrative rule. 
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the action. 
(H) During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer or law firm asso-
ciated therewith shall not make or participate in making a statement, other than a 
quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable person would expect 
to be disseminated by means of public communication if it is made outside the official 
course of the proceeding and relates to: 
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved. 
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cases.32 Accordingly, subsections (A) through (D) of DR 7-107 prohibit 
comments during criminal trials that are "reasonably likely to inter-
fere with a fair trial."33 
DR 7-107(G) absolutely prohibits a lawyer in a pending civil case 
from making public comments on any of the subjects enumerated in 
the rule.34 For example, lawyers are forbidden from making public 
statements relating to: "[e]vidence regarding the occurrence or trans-
action involved; ... [t]he character, credibility, or criminal record of a 
party [or] witness; ... [or] the merits of the claims or defenses of a 
party."35 In addition to these absolute prohibitions, DR 7-107(G) also 
prohibits comments regarding "[a]ny other matter reasonably likely 
to interfere with a fair trial of the action."36 DR 7-107(G) therefore 
creates a conclusive presumption that a civil lawyer's comments on 
any of the enumerated subjects will be "reasonably likely" to interfere 
with a fair trial, giving the lawyer no opportunity to prove otherwise.37 
The adoption of DR 7-107, however, did not silence the debate 
regarding trial publicity rules. While a number of courts upheld the 
circumscriptions imposed by the "reasonable likelihood" standard,38 
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or prospective 
witness. 
(3) Physical evidence or the performance or results of any examinations or tests or 
the refusal or failure of a party to submit to such. 
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims, defenses, or positions of an interested 
person. 
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair hearing. 
(I) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 do not preclude a lawyer from replying to 
charges of misconduct publicly made against him or from participating in the proceed-
ings of legislative, administrative, or other investigative bodies. 
(J) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees and associates 
from making an extra-judicial statement that he would be prohibited from making 
under DR 7-107. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
32 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 n.85 (1983). 
33 Id. DR 7-107. 
34 Id. DR 7-107(G). 
36Id. DR 7-107 (G)(l), (2), (4). 
36 Id. DR 7-107(G)(5). 
37 See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 1979). The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected appellee's argument that "the rule should be read with 
a gloss that prohibits only those comments which are reasonably likely to interfere with the 
administration of justice." Id. 
38 See, e.g., In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 603, 610 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
488 U.S. 946 (1988); Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 362; United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969); Younger v. Smith, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1973); Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 575 (Del. 1981); In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 493 (N.J. 1982); 
In re Rachmiel, 449 A.2d 505, 655 (N.J. 1982); State v. Carter, 365 A.2d 473, 474 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1976). 
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other courts held that the standard unduly restricted attorneys' First 
Amendment rights.39 Three cases, Chicago Council of Lawyers v. 
Bauer,4o Hirschkop v. Snead,41 and Markfield v. Association of the 
Bar,42 often are cited as illustrations of the various interpretations of 
the "reasonable likelihood" standard.43 
In Bauer, an association of local lawyers and several of the associa-
tion's members brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment and 
an injunction against enforcement of a local rule of the district court 
and DR 7-107.44 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit held that the "reasonable likelihood" standard of DR 7-107 
was unconstitutional in both civil and criminal cases and that the 
"serious and imminent threat" standard, a narrower, more restrictive 
standard, should apply instead.45 The Bauer court further stated that 
rules should be formulated, declaring: 
that comment concerning certain matters will presumptively be 
deemed a serious and imminent threat to the fair administration 
of justice so as to justify a prohibition against them. One charged 
with violating such a rule would of course have the opportunity 
to prove that his statement was not one that posed such a serious 
and imminent threat, but the burden would be upon him.46 
In Hirschkop v. Snead, an attorney brought suit to challenge Rule 
7-107 of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, which fol-
lows DR 7-107 verbatim.47 The plaintiff claimed that Virginia Rule 
7-107 violated lawyers' freedom of speech.4B The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the "serious and imminent 
39 See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 1975); Chicago Council of Lawyers 
v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975), eert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 
111, 114-15 (7th Cir. 1971); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1970); Markfield v. 
Association of the Bar, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 337 N.E.2d 612 
(N.Y. 1975). 
40 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), eert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); see infra text accompanying 
notes 44-46. 
41 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); see infra text accompanying notes 47-51. 
42 370 N.Y.S.2d 82 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 337 N.E.2d 612 (N.Y. 1975); see infra 
text accompanying notes 52-54. 
43 See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
280-81 (1992). 
44 Bauer, 522 F.2d at 247. 
45 Id. at 249. 
46Id. at 251. 
47 Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 361-62 (4th Cir. 1979). 
48 I d. at 363. 
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threat" standard proposed by Bauer with respect to criminal cases.49 
The Hirschkop court found the "reasonable likelihood" standard to be 
a constitutional check on the speech of criminal lawyers.5o The Hir-
schkop court, however, found that the "reasonable likelihood" stand-
ard as applied to civil cases is unconstitutional because it is vague and 
overbroad and thus violates the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment,51 
In Markfield v. Association of the Bar, an attorney in the Tombs' 
Riots trial participated in a panel discussion concerning prison rebel-
lions that was carried over the radio.52 The trial court found the 
attorney guilty of violating New York's DR 7-107(D).53 The First 
Department of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme 
Court dismissed the charge of professional misconduct, explaining 
that the "reasonable likelihood" standard of DR 7-107 may be consti-
tutionally adequate, but declaring that the rule should be applied only 
where an attorney's extrajudicial statements present a "clear and 
present danger" to the administration of justice.54 
Experts cite the preceding three cases as the impetus for the 1978 
amendment to the ABA Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free 
Press, which limited lawyer publicity that presented a "clear and 
present danger" to a fair trial,55 and the 1983 adoption of Model Rule 
3.6.56 Model Rule 3.6 was based on the Model Code of Professional 
49 [d. at 362. 
50 [d. at 362, 370. 
51 [d. at 370, 373. 
52 Markfield v. Association of the Bar, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 
337 N.E.2d 612 (N.Y. 1975). 
53 [d. 
54 [d. at 85. 
55 AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8·7-8·13 (2d ed. 1986). The 
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer decision led to the incorporation of the "clear and present 
danger" standard into the Fair Trial and Free Press standard. [d. at 8·7; see AMERICAN BAR 
ASS'N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 280-81 (1992) (discussing the 
history of the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard). 
56 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt. (1993). Model Rule 3.6 reads: 
(a) A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would 
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially preju-
dicing an adjudicative proceeding. 
(b) A statement referred to in paragraph (a) ordinarily is likely to have such an effect 
when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other 
proceeding that could result in incarceration, and the statement relates to: 
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a 
criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testi-
mony of a party or witness; 
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Responsibility and the ABA Standards Relating to Fair Trial and 
Free Press, as amended in 1978.57 Unlike its predecessors, Model Rule 
3.6 proscribes conduct that has a "substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding," making no distinction be-
tween civil matters triable to a jury and criminal matters.58 Those 
who formulated the Model Rules of Professional Conduct apparently 
thought the "substantial likelihood" standard approximated the "clear 
and present danger" standard recommended by the Advisory Com-
mittee on Fair Trial and Free Press. 59 
(2) in a criminal cage or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility 
of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, 
admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or 
failure to make a statement; 
(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure 
of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical 
evidence expected to be presented; 
(4) any opinion ag to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal 
case or proceeding that could result in incarceration; 
(5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inad-
missible as evidence in a trial and would if disclosed create a substantial risk of 
prejudicing an impartial trial; or 
(6) the fact that a defendant hag been charged with a crime, unless there is included 
therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the 
defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty. 
(c) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b)(1-5), a lawyer involved in the investigation 
or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration: 
(1) the general nature of the claim or defense; 
(2) the information contained in a public record; 
(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including the general scope 
of the investigation, the offense or claim or defense involved and, except when prohib-
ited by law, the identity of the persons involved; 
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation; 
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary 
thereto; 
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there 
is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual 
or to the public interest; and 
(7) in a criminal cage: 
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused; 
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in 
apprehension of that person; 
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and 
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the 
length of the investigation. 
Id. Rule 3.6. 
57Id. Rule 3.6 cmt. 
58 Id. Rule 3.6(a). 
59 Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1037 (1991) (citations omitted); see In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 
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In August of 1994, the ABA House of Delegates substantially 
amended Model Rule 3.6 for the first time since its 1983 adoption.60 
The amendments to Model Rule 3.6 represent a direct response to 
Gentile v. State Bar, which raised First Amendment questions about 
portions of Model Rule 3.6.61 
1. The Gentile Case 
In Gentile v. State Bar, a Nevada criminal defense attorney held a 
press conference hours after his client was indicted in order to coun-
teract what he perceived as unfair press coverage of his client's case.62 
The police had charged his client, the owner of a security vault com-
pany, with the theft of drugs and travelers' checks that police had 
stored in one of the vaults.63 Press reports had quoted various police 
sources as saying that the theft constituted an attempt to discredit 
the undercover police operation, that the defendant-client had busi-
ness relationships with the targets of an undercover police probe, 
and that the police detectives who were possible suspects had been 
"cleared."64 In holding the press conference, the attorney sought to 
present weaknesses in the State's case to counteract negative state-
ments made by the police and prosecutors in the press and to protect 
the potential jury venire.65 Accordingly, the attorney decided to hold 
the first formal press conference of his career.66 
The night before the press conference, the attorney and two col-
leagues carefully researched the extent of the obligations of an attor-
ney under the Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 (the Nevada Rule), 
worded identically to Model Rule 3.6.67 The attorney decided that the 
timing of a statement was essential in the evaluation of potential 
prejudice.68 Because the attorney knew that a jury would not be 
impaneled for at least six months, and because the attorney had read 
cases where no prejudice was found to result from "far worse" state-
ments made only two and four months before trial, the attorney 
483, 493 (N.J. 1982) (asserting that substantial likelihood of material prejudice standard is a 
linguistic equivalent of clear and present danger). 
60 GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 30, at 228. 
61 [d. at xi, 228. 
62 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1041-42. 
63 [d. at 1039-40, 1041-42. 
64 [d. at 1040. 
65 [d. at 1042. 
66 [d. 
67 See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1044. 
68 [d. 
1996] PUBLICITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 579 
determined that the proposed statement was not "substantially likely 
to result in material prejudice."69 
At the press conference, the attorney asserted the innocence of his 
client, stating that his client was a scapegoat in an attempt to cover 
up police corruption.70 The attorney further alleged that there was 
more evidence that the police detective took the drugs and the trav-
elers' checks "than any other living human being."71 The attorney also 
attacked the credibility of other victims of the theft, many of whom 
were convicted money launderers or drug dealers.72 
Events at trial confirmed that the proposed statement was not 
substantially likely to result in material prejudice.73 Many of the ju-
rors recollected news reports of the alleged theft, but "not a single 
juror indicated any recollection of [the attorney] or his press confer-
ence."74 After presentation of the evidence that the attorney had 
outlined earlier at the press conference, his client was acquitted.75 
Following a complaint filed by the State Bar of Nevada, the South-
ern Nevada Disciplinary Board (Board) found that the pretrial com-
ments of the attorney had violated the Nevada Rule.76 The Board 
recommended that the attorney be privately reprimanded.77 The Ne-
vada Supreme Court affirmed.78 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the attorney ar-
gued that (1) the Nevada Rule was unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad as applied to him,79 and (2) the Nevada Rule violated the 
First Amendment by punishing public comments by an attorney dur-
ing a pending case that merely posed a "substantial likelihood of 
material prejudice" to a trial as opposed to a "clear and present 
danger."8o The Supreme Court accepted the first argument by a five-
to-four margin, but rejected the second argument by a different five-
to-four vote.S! 
691d. 
70 ld. at 1059 app. A. 
71 ld. 
72 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1045. 
731d. at 1047. 
741d. 
751d. 
761d. at 1033. 
77 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033. 
781d. 
79 See id. at 1048. 
80 See id. at 1068--69. 
81 See id. at 1048, 1051. 
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Justice Kennedy, writing for the five-to-four majority on the first 
argument, reversed the Nevada Supreme Court on the ground that 
the Nevada Rule was void for vagueness. 82 Justice Kennedy explained 
that the "safe harbor" provision of the Nevada Rule83 misled the 
attorney into thinking that he was guaranteed immunity from disci-
pline when his public comments merely described the general nature 
of the defense.84 Thus, by holding in favor of the attorney on this issue, 
the Kennedy majority exhibited some solicitude for the dilemma of a 
lawyer who seeks to counteract negative publicity. 
Justice Kennedy also stated that the Nevada Rule failed to provide 
the necessary fair notice to a lawyer seeking protection of the safe 
harbor provision that allows a criminal lawyer to explain the "gen-
eral" nature of a client's defense "without elaboration."85 Specifically, 
Justice Kennedy found that the provision gave deficient guidance 
because the terms "general" and "elaboration" were classic terms of 
degree, which "have no settled usage or tradition of interpretation in 
law."86 As such, the Nevada Rule left the attorney with "no principle 
for determining when his remarks [would] pass from the safe harbor 
of the general to the forbidden sea of the elaborated."87 In support of 
the preceding conclusion, Justice Kennedy quoted portions of the 
attorney's press conference indicating that the attorney conscien-
tiously researched the requirements of the Nevada Rule, and that the 
remarks of the attorney were circumspect and general.88 Justice Ken-
nedy asserted that "[t]he fact [that the attorney] was found in viola-
tion of the Rules after studying them and making a conscious effort 
at compliance demonstrates that [the Nevada Rule] creates a trap for 
the wary as well as the unwary."89 
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the Court's five-to-four rejec-
tion of the attorney's First Amendment argument.90 The Chief Jus-
tice wrote that "the speech of lawyers representing clients in pend-
ing cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard" than 
the "clear and present danger" standard advocated by the attorney.91 
82 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048 (Kennedy, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, JJ.). 
83 The "safe harbor" provision ofthe Nevada Rule, which was held unconstitutional, is verba-
tim of Model Rule 3.6(c). For the full text of Model Rule 3.6(c), see supra note 56. 
84 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048. 
85 [d. 
86 [d. at 1048-49. 
87 [d. at 1049. 
88 [d. 
89 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 105l. 
90 [d. at 1062. 
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The Chief Justice wrote that "the 'substantial likelihood of material 
prejudice' standard constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance 
between the First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases 
and the state's interest in fair trials ... and it imposes only narrow 
and necessary limitations on lawyers' speech."92 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist reasoned that as "key participants" in the criminal jus-
tice system, lawyers are subject to controls on their speech in order 
to ensure trial fairness.93 Furthermore, lawyers' "extrajudicial state-
ments pose a threat to the fairness of a pending proceeding since 
lawyers' statements are likely to be received as especially authori-
tative."94 
2. The 1994 Amendment to Model Rule 3.6 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Gentile v. State Bar prompted 
the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
(Standing Committee), whose task is to review the continued effec-
tiveness and enforceability of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, to begin work on an amendment to Model Rule 3.6.95 In August 
1994, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the amendment proposed 
by the Standing Committee.96 
91 ld. at 1074. 
921d. at 1075 (Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, JJ.). The remaining four Justices 
indicated skepticism, but eventually pronounced it nonessential to determine the constitution-
ality of Model Rule 3.6, noting that the difference between a "substantial likelihood of mate-
rial prejudice" and a "clear and present danger" could prove to be "mere semantics." ld. at 
1036-37. 
93 See id. at 1074. 
94 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074 (citations omitted). 
95 GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 30, at 228, 233-35. 
96 See id. at 233. 1994 Model Rule 3.6 reads: 
(a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation 
of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would 
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially preju-
dicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter. 
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state: 
(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the 
identity of the persons involved; 
(2) the information contained in a public record; 
(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress; 
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation; 
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary 
thereto; 
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The amendment achieves three goals. First, the amendment refor-
mulates the types of extrajudicial statements that lawyers may make 
notwithstanding the general prohibition of extrajudicial statements 
that will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a court 
proceeding.97 Second, and perhaps most importantly, the amendment 
adds a new "safe harbor" provision that permits lawyers to make 
statements for the purpose of guarding against undue prejudice due 
to recent adverse publicity initiated by someone else.98 Third, the 
amendment explicitly states that Model Rule 3.6(a) governs lawyers 
who are participating or have participated in the investigation of a 
case, as well as their associates in their firm or government agency.99 
III. THE NEED FOR UNIVERSAL ADOPTION OF 1994 MODEL 
RULE 3.6 IN CIVIL CASES 
States should adopt trial pUblicity rules similar to 1994 Model Rule 
3.6 for several reasons. First, those states that remain governed by 
DR 7-107(G) should adopt 1994 Model Rule 3.6 because DR 7-107(G) 
imposes more restrictions on attorney speech than 1994 Model Rule 
3.6,100 and any rule that prohibits attorneys' speech in civil cases is of 
extremely doubtful constitutional character. 101 Moreover, the more 
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there 
is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual 
or to the public interest; and 
(7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6): 
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused; 
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in 
apprehension of that person; 
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and 
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the 
length of the investigation. 
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable 
lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue preju-
dicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A 
statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is 
necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity. 
(d) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer subject to 
paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a). 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1994). 
97 Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(b) (1994) with MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(c) (1993). 
98 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(c) (1994). 
99 Id. Rule 3.6(d)& cmt. 
100 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 12.2, at 634 (1986) ("The 'substan-
tial likelihood' test of the Model Rules plainly permits more extrajudicial commentary by 
lawyers than does the 'reasonable likelihood' test of DR 7-107."). 
101 See discussion infra section III.C. 
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permissive 1994 Model Rule 3.6 allows environmental poverty law-
yers to employ publicity, while DR 7-107(G) creates a chilling effect 
on environmental justice lawyering and is one weapon in a vast arse-
nal used to intimidate environmental justice communities.l02 Further-
more, a number of courts have concluded that a more lenient standard 
should apply in civil litigation than in criminal litigation.103 Finally, 
those states that remain governed by Model Rule 3.6 should adopt 
1994 Model Rule 3.6 to reflect the Supreme Court's ruling in Gentile 
v. State Bar.l04 
A. A Needfor Uniformity 
Only eight states currently remain governed by the restrictions of 
DR 7-107(G).105 The majority of states instead have adopted less 
restrictive standards.Hl6 Twenty-one states have adopted Model Rule 
3.6 verbatim,107 while fourteen states have adopted slight variations 
102 See discussion infra section III.D. 
103 Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 373 (4th Cir. 1979) (noting "significant differences" 
between civil and criminal cases must be considered in evaluating constitutionality of rules); 
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 257-58 (7th Cir. 1975) (noting "particular 
distinctions" between civil and criminal cases demand less restrictions on speech in civil cases), 
cm. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (citing 
with approval Hirschkop and Bauer); Ruggieri v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 503 F. Supp. 
1036, 1039-40 (D.R.I. 1980) (noting that the standard in civil cases must be at least equal to or 
less restrictive than that allowed for in criminal proceedings). 
104 See discussion infra section IV. 
105 Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Ohio, Tennessee, and Vermont have adopted DR 
7-107(G) verbatim. GA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(G) (current with 
amendments through Jan. 15, 1995); IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
107(G) (current with amendments through Jan. 1, 1995); MAss. RULES OF THE SUPREME 
JUDICIAL COURT DR 7-107(G) (current with amendments through Jan. 15, 1995); NEB. CODE 
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(G) (current with amendments through Oct. 15, 
1994); OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(G) (current with amendments 
through June 29, 1995); TENN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(G) (current 
with amendments through July 15, 1995); VT. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 
7-107(G) (current with amendments through May 23,1994). Although North Carolina did not 
adopt DR 7-107(G) verbatim, the state did adopt the "reasonable likelihood" test of DR 7-107. 
N.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.7(d) (current with amendments through Dec. 
8,1994). 
106 See WOLFRAM, supra note 100, at 634 ("The 'substantial likelihood' test of the Model Rules 
plainly permits more extrajudicial commentary by lawyers than does the 'reasonable likelihood' 
test of DR 7-107."). 
107 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Lou-
isiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have adopted Model Rule 3.6 verbatim. ALA. 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through Apr. 1, 1995); 
ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through Oct. 
1, 1995); ARIZ. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ER 3.6 (current with amendments through 
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of Model Rule 3.6.108 Six other states and the District of Columbia have 
adopted standards that are even less restrictive than Model Rule 
Aug. 1, 1995); ARK. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments 
through Dec. 1, 1994); CONN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with 
amendments through Oct. 1, 1994); IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (cur-
rent with amendments through Nov. 20,1995); IND. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 
3.6 (current with amendments through June 1, 1995); KAN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through Oct. 15, 1994); Ky. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through Nov. 1, 1994); LA. RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through Jan. 1, 1995); MD. RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through Mar. 1, 1995); MISS. 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through Apr. 15, 1995); 
Mo. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through Dec. 1, 
1994); NEV. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 177 (current with amendments through 
Sept. 20,1993); N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RPC 3.6 (current with amendments 
through Mar. 1, 1995); PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amend-
ments through Mar. 1, 1995); R.I. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with 
amendments through May 11, 1993); S.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current 
with amendments through May 15, 1995); w. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 
(current with amendments through Jan. 1993); WIS. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT SCR 
20:3.6 (current with amendments through Aug. 1, 1995); WYo. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through Dec. 1993). 
108 Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, and Texas have adopted Model Rule 3.6 with minor modifications. COLO. RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through July 1, 1995); DEL. 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through Apr. 1, 1995); 
HAW. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through Apr. 
15, 1995); MONT. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments 
through July 15, 1995); N.H. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amend-
ments through Dec. 31, 1993); N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (cur-
rent with amendments through Feb. 14, 1995); OKLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 
3.6 (current with amendments through Sept. 1, 1995); S.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through Jan. 1, 1995); TEx. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.07 (current with amendments through Sept. 1, 1994). Florida, 
Michigan, Minnesota, and Washington have adopted only subsection (a) of Model Rule 3.6. FLA. 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-3.6 (current with amendments through Apr. 1, 
1995); MICH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through 
Feb. 1, 1995); MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments 
through Sept. 15, 1994); WASH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RPC 3.6 (current with 
amendments through Sept. 1, 1995). Florida adds "due to its creation of an imminent and 
substantial detrimental effect on that proceeding" to the "substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing standard" of subsection (a); Minnesota limits the application of subsection (a) to 
"pending criminal jury trial[s];" and although Washington only adopts subsection (a), the re-
mainder of Model Rule 3.6 is present in the "Guidelines for Applying RPC 3.6." FLA. RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-3.6 (current with amendments through Apr. 1, 1995); MINN. 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through Sept. 15, 
1994); WASH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RPC 3.6 (current with amendments through 
Sept. 1, 1995). Utah adopted a version of Model Rule 3.6 employing a "substantial likelihood of 
materially influencing" test. UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with 
amendments through May 15, 1995). 
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3.6.109 California is the only state that has adopted 1994 Model Rule 
3.6.110 The patchwork of ethical rules affecting trial publicity detailed 
above makes compliance difficult for attorneys and exhibits the need 
for uniformity. 
B. A Comparison of 1994 Model Rule 3.6 and DR 7-107(G) 
1994 Model Rule 3.6 is less restrictive111 than DR 7-107(G) in a 
number of significant ways. First, 1994 Model Rule 3.6 prohibits only 
those comments that "the lawyer knows or reasonably should know 
. . . will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an 
adjudicative proceeding .... "112 DR 7-107(G), however, restricts law-
yers from speaking on public matters "reasonably likely to interfere 
with a fair trial of the action."113 
Second, rather than creating a conclusive presumption that certain 
types of speech will have such a prejudicial effect, as does DR 7-
107(G), the commentary of 1994 Model Rule 3.6 merely gives illustra-
tions of types of speech that are "more likely than not" to have such 
an effect.114 Thus, the presumptions under 1994 Model Rule 3.6 are 
109 See D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through 
July 1, 1993) ("serious and imminent threat to the impartiality of the judge or jury"); ILL. RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through June 1, 1995) ("serious 
and imminent threat to the fairness of an adjudicative proceeding"); ME. RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (current with amendments through May 15, 1995) ("substantial 
danger of interference with the administration of justice"); N.M. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT Rule 16-306 (current with amendments through May 15, 1995) ("clear and present 
danger of prejudicing the [criminal] proceeding"); N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Rule 3.6 (current with amendments through Jan. 15, 1995) ("serious and imminent threat of 
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding"); OR. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 7-107 (current with amendments through Dec. 1, 1994) ("serious and imminent 
threat to the fact-finding process in an adjudicative proceeding and acts with indifference to 
that effect"); VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(A) (current with amend-
ments through Aug. 15, 1995) ("clear and present danger of interfering with the fairness of 
[criminal] trial by jury"). 
110 CA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5-120 (current with amendments through 
Oct. 1, 1995). 
1111994 Model Rule 3.6 may be viewed as more restrictive than DR 7-107 in one limited sense. 
1994 Model Rule 3.6(b) eliminates DR 7-107(c)(7), which provided that a lawyer may reveal "[a]t 
the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence seized, other than a confession, 
admission or statement" because such revelations may be substantially prejudicial. MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt. (Model Code Comparison) (1994). 
112 Id. Rule 3.6. 
113 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1983). 
114 Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt.5 (1994) with MODEL 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(G) (1983). Comment 5 indicates: 
[t]here are, on the other hand, certain subjects which are more likely than not to have 
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rebuttable, rather than conclusive.ll5 Finally, 1994 Model Rule 3.6 
empowers a lawyer to protect a client by making a limited response 
to adverse publicity believed to be substantially prejudicial to the 
client, while DR 7-107(G) has no comparable provision.n6 
c. The Constitutionality of DR 7-107(G) 
The four federal courts that have examined the constitutionality 
of DR 7-107(G)-two federal appellate courts and two federal trial 
courts-all have struck down DR 7-107(G) as an unconstitutional 
restraint on attorney speech.l17 Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer 
and Ruggieri v. Johns-Manville Products found DR 7-107(G) to be 
constitutionally infirm because of the rule's failure to restrict the ban 
on comments of lawyers to instances where those comments pose a 
"serious and imminent threat" to a fair trial.118 Hirschkop v. Snead, 
without advocating a different standard, found the "reasonable like-
a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil 
matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result 
in incarceration. These subjects relate to: 
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a 
criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testi-
mony of a party or witness; 
(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility 
of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, 
admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or 
failure to make a statement; 
(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure 
of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical 
evidence expected to be presented; 
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal 
case or proceeding that could result in incarceration; 
(5) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be 
inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk 
of prejudicing an impartial trial; or 
(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included 
therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the 
defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 cmt.5 (1994). 
115 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(c) (1994). 
116 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1983). 
117 Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 
F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), em. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F. Supp. 85 
(E.D. Tex. 1981); Ruggieri v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 503 F. Supp. 1036 (D.R.1. 1980); 
see also Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1062 (D.C. Cir.) (expressing "serious 
reservations about the wisdom and even the constitutionality" of DR 7-107(G», em. granted, 
469 U.S. 915 (1984), and vacated, remanded, 472 U.S. 424 (1985). 
118 Bauer, 522 F.2d at 251; Ruggieri, 503 F. Supp. at 1040. 
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lihood" standard unconstitutional because the standard is vague and 
overbroad.l19 Shadid v. Jackson, on the other hand, found the "rea-
sonable likelihood" standard unconstitutional because it operates as a 
prior restraint. l20 Thus, no federal or state appellate authority has 
held that public comments by lawyers in a civil suit may be prohibited 
if they are "reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial."121 
In Gentile v. State Bar, as previously noted, the "substantiallikeli-
hood of material prejudice" standard passed constitutional muster 
only because five Justices, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concluded 
that the standard was sufficiently "narrowly tailored" to protect the 
interest of the state in fair trials without unduly restricting attorneys' 
right of free speech.122 A different majority, led by Justice Kennedy, 
concluded that even this less restrictive standard was impermissibly 
vague and overbroad as applied to the criminal defense attorney's 
public comments regarding the evidence, defenses, and credibility of 
witnesses in a pending case.l23 
Unlike Model Rule 3.6, DR 7-107(G) is not narrowly tailored to 
strike a constitutionally permissible balance between an attorney's 
right of free speech and the state interest in fair trials. l24 By compari-
son to Model Rule 3.6, DR 7-107(G) is patently vague and over-
broad.l25 Given the fact that the United States Supreme Court has 
narrowly held constitutional only the more lenient standard of Model 
Rule 3.6,126 the "reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial" stand-
ard of DR 7-107(G) most likely would be found by the Court to be 
facially unconstitutional.127 
119 Hirsehkop, 594 F.2d at 373. 
120 Shadid, 521 F. Supp. at 86. 
121 The New Jersey Supreme Court has held the "reasonable likelihood of interference with a 
fair trial" standard constitutional as applied to lawyers' public comments on a criminal matter. 
In re Rachmiel, 449 A.2d 505, 511 (N.J. 1982); In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 486 (N.J. 1982). The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has upheld the standard with respect to comments on an admin-
istrative proceeding. Widoff v. Disciplinary Bd., 420 A.2d 41, 44 (Pa. 1980). 
122 Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074-76 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., White, O'Connor, Scalia, 
Souter, JJ.). 
123 Id. at 1048--51 (Kennedy, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, JJ.). 
124 See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 373 (4th Cir. 1979) ("The dearth of evidence that 
lawyers' comments taint civil trials and the courts' ability to protect confidential information 
establish that the rule's restrictions on freedom of speech are essential to fair civil trials."). 
125 See id. 
126 Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074-76. 
127 See Hirsehkop, 594 F.2d at 373; Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258--59 
(7th Cir. 1975), eert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F. Supp. 85, 86--87 (E.D. 
Tex. 1981). 
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In holding DR 7-107(G) unconstitutional, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. 
Bauer exposed the inherent vagueness and overbreadth of each of the 
provisions of section (G).l28 Subsection (1) of DR 7-107(G) prohibits 
any public statements concerning "[e]vidence regarding the occur-
rence or transaction involved."129 Such a sweeping prohibition might 
prevent an environmental poverty lawyer from notifying the public 
about an industry's method of disposing of toxic wastes because tes-
timony about these practices would probably be relevant evidence.130 
DR 7-107(G)(2), which restricts comment concerning the "charac-
ter, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness or prospective 
witness,"131 is, "[a]rguably the most defensible portion" of DR 7-
107(G).132 The Bauer court found, however, that even this limited 
provision should not stand.l33 Although the Bauer court stated that 
"[u]sually there would be little need or ethical justification" for such 
statements, sometimes character and credibility statements would be 
appropriate, such as when they involve statements or actions of public 
officials. 134 
The performance or results of tests, possibly containing vital infor-
mation, also cannot be the topic of extrajudicial comment pursuant to 
DR 7-107(G)(3).135 According to the Bauer court, the need of the 
public for knowledgeable and thorough discussion of this type of 
information "far outweighs any possible benefit that might accrue in 
terms of maintaining the laboratory conditions of a civil trial."136 The 
Bauer court also found that the prohibition of DR 7-107(G)(4), which 
prohibits opinions "as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a 
party,"137 was so overbroad that it would restrict attorney speech on 
legal, social, and public policy issues.l3s The court elaborated: 
128 Bauer, 522 F.2d at 258-59. 
129 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(G)(I) (1983). See supra note 
31 for full text of DR 7-107. 
130 Cf Bauer, 522 F.2d at 258 (stating that DR 7-107(G)(I) would prevent attorneys from 
informing the public of unsafe flight procedures). 
131 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(G)(3) (1983). See supra note 
31 for full text of DR 7-107. 
132 Bauer, 522 F.2d at 258. 
133 [d. at 259. 
134 [d. 
135 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(G)(3) (1983); see Bauer, 522 
F.2d at 258. 
136 Bauer, 522 F.2d at 258. 
137 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(G)(4) (1983). See supra note 
31 for full text of DR 7-107. 
138 See Bauer, 522 F.2d at 258. 
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if the case is one involving "public policy considerations" the at-
torney could not offer his views on the social issue. Yet his involve-
ment in the suit would show his interest in and familiarity with 
the question. An informed viewpoint would be removed from the 
public forum without justification. We can envision little benefit 
from this prohibition and find that as drawn it would conflict with 
the very purpose of the First Amendment.139 
Finally, subsection (5) of DR 7-107(G) prohibits public comment on 
"[a]ny other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of 
the action."14o The Bauer court held this restriction to be so vague that 
it would not be constitutional, even if substituted with the less restric-
tive "serious and imminent threat of harm" standard.141 The court 
stated that "[i]ts chilling effect is obvious."142 
D. Using DR 7-107(G) to Intimidate Environmental 
Poverty Lawyers 
DR 7-107(G) has been used as a weapon to intimidate environ-
mental poverty lawyers and their communities. Polluters, especially 
industrial polluters, are using the legal system to launch a new wave 
of attack against the environmental justice movement.143 Across the 
United States, industrial polluters are lashing back at environmental 
justice advocates by seeking injunctions to limit their activities, attack-
ing with Strategic Lawsuit Against Political Participation (SLAPP) 
suits, and, in the case of environmental poverty lawyers, filing bar 
grievances against them for violations of trial publicity rules. l44 Colo-
rado Supreme Court Grievance Committee v. District Courtl45 illus-
trates one attorney's fight for environmental justice, while facing the 
threat of disciplinary action. 
139 Id.; cf. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 475 F. Supp. 928, 936-37 
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (declining to enter any order limiting communications between plaintiffs' coun-
sel and third parties, based on considerations such as "the unique nature and public importance 
of this litigation, the contemporaneous action in related matters by other government agencies 
[and] the first amendment rights of counsel ... ," but noting that counsel was bound by profes-
sional standards). 
140 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-1D7(G)(5) (1983). See supra note 
31 for full text of DR 7-107. 
141 Bauer, 552 F.2d at 259. 
142Id. 
143 Letter from Jeanne Gauna, staff member, SouthWest Organizing Project, & Richard 
Moore, Coordinator, Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice, to Friends 
of SouthWest Organizing Project 1 (Feb. 22, 1995) (on file with BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRON-
MENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW). 
144 See id. 
145 850 P.2d 150 (Colo. 1993). 
590 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 23:567 
1. The Colorado Supreme Court Grievance Committee Case 
In the summer of 1991, attorney Macon Cowles filed a complaint on 
behalf of several residents of the Globeville section of Denver, Colo-
rado in the District Court for the City and County of Denver against 
Asarco, Inc. (Asarco).l46 The complaint alleged that the Asarco Globe 
Plant, a cadmium refining smelter, released, discharged, and leaked 
toxic chemicals that injured property and business interests and threat-
ened public health.147 
Globeville is a low-income, largely minority neighborhood.148 Like 
many inner-city areas, Globeville and the surrounding communities of 
Swansea and Elyria have "borne the brunt of heavy industrial uses 
and other locally undesirable land uses."149 From low-level radioactive 
waste to sewer plants to slaughterhouses and packing plants, these 
communities have suffered disproportionately from environmental 
harms, yet they have few resources with which to combat these 
harms.150 TYPically, it is difficult for these communities to find legal 
counsel.151 In fact, six attorneys declined to represent the Globeville 
plaintiffs before Cowles took their case.152 
The plaintiffs in Escamilla v. Asarco, Inc. claimed, specifically, that 
operations of the Asarco Globe Plant had resulted in toxic chemical 
emissions into the air, soil, surface water, and groundwater of the 
community where plaintiffs and other class members own, occupy, or 
use property.l53 These emissions contain heavy metals such as cad-
mium, arsenic, and lead.l54 The plaintiffs further claimed that the 
146 Complaint at 2, Cowles v. Colorado Sup. Ct. Grievance Comm., No. 92-CV -0984 (Colo. Dist. 
Ct. Sept. 29, 1992). Asarco is an acronym for the American Smelting and Refining Company. 
147 Amended Complaint at 2, Ramirez v. Asarco, Inc., No. 91-CV-5716 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 
23,1993). 
148 Complaint at 4, Cowles (No. 92-CV-0984). 
149 See Lord & Shutkin, supra note 2, at 6. 
150 Complaint at 4, Cowles (No. 92-CV-0984). The situation in Globeville is representative of 
environmental justice cases. See Lord & Shutkin, supra note 2, at 6 n.26. See generally CON-
FRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS (Robert D. Bullard ed., 
1992); ToXIC STRUGGLES: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (Richard 
Hofrichter ed., 1993); Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice 
and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993); Cole, 
Empowerment, supra note 4. 
151 See Complaint at 4, Cowles (No. 92-CV-0984). 
152 Telephone Interview with Macon Cowles, attorney for plaintiffs (Jan. 19, 1995). 
153 Amended Complaint at 10, Ramirez v. Asarco, Inc., No. 91-CV-5716 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 
23, 1993). For clarity, the class action suit will be referred to as Escamilla v. Asarco, Inc. 
although the suit originally was filed as Ramirez v. Asarco, Inc. 
154 Id. 
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smelter not only devalued their property, wells, and water rights and 
caused business losses, but also that the toxic emissions significantly 
increased their risk of developing serious latent diseases, including 
"brain damage and retardation, various types of cancer, respiratory 
diseases, infectious diseases, and immune system changes."155 
On August 21, 1991, one day after Cowles filed an amended com-
plaint, Neighbors for a Toxic-Free Community and the local chapter 
of the Sierra Club held a press conference outside the entrance gate 
to the Asarco Globe Plant.156 Although the conference was sponsored 
by citizens' and environmental groups, Cowles spoke at the press 
conference and also gave interviews to the press.157 
In September 1991, the law firm of Holland & Hart, Asarco's coun-
sel, sent a letter to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, charging that 
Cowles violated Colorado Disciplinary Rule 7-107(G), which is iden-
tical to DR 7-107(G), by commenting on Asarco.158 The comments 
identified by Holland & Hart were disseminated in two ways. First, 
Cowles's comments at the August 21, 1991 press conference were 
videotaped and subsequently broadcast on local news programs.159 
Second, a Sierra Club reporter interviewed Cowles and then quoted the 
comments in the Sierra Club's September-October 1991 newsletter.16o 
155 [d. at 11-12. 
156 Complaint at 2, Cowles v. Colorado Sup. Ct. Grievance Comm., No. 92-CV"'{)984 (Colo. Dist. 
Ct. Sept. 29, 1992). Neighbors for a Toxic-Free Community is a citizens' environmental group. 
[d. 
157 Complaint at 2, Cowles (No. 92-CV-0984); Cowles is reported as saying the following: 
1. KWGN TV Channel 2, Denver, CO, August 21, 1991, 9:12 P.M. 
This is the only cadmium smelter in the United States which is in a residential area 
and we aim to shut it down. 
2. KUSA TV Channel 9, Denver, CO, August 21, 1991, 5:10 P.M. In response to a 
statement of Asarco's plant manager that all operations are safe and its emissions meet 
all local, state and federal standards: 
[ w Jell I think it's misleading because there aren't, there are no cadmium standards, 
federal or state and that are no arsenic standards, federal or state. 
3. KOA Radio, AM 850, Denver, CO, August 21, 1991, 5:35 P.M. 
The cadmium, lead and arsenic that is produced here is shipped elsewhere around 
the globe and it enriches Asarco. The poisons that are left as a consequence of the 
manufacturing of cadmium stays [sicJ here in Globeville. 
Letter from William E. Murane & Scott S. Barker, Attorneys at Law, Holland & Hart, to L. 
Michael Henry, Chief Investigative Counsel, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of 
Colorado 1 (Sept. 23,1991) (on file with the BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW 
REVIEW). 
158 Letter from William E. Murane & Scott S. Barker to L. Michael Henry, supra note 157, at 1. 
159 [d. at 2-3. 
160 [d. at 3. Cowles is quoted in the Enos Mills News, a publication of the Sierra Club, as 
saying: 
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On December 13, 1991, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel notified 
Cowles that it was proceeding with an investigation of Holland & 
Hart's allegations.161 In February 1992, Cowles filed a complaint against 
the Colorado Supreme Court Grievance Committee and its Chair, 
David L. Wood (the Grievance Committee defendants), in the District 
Court for the City and County of Denver.162 Cowles alleged, inter alia, 
that DR 7-107(G) was unconstitutional both on its face and in its 
application because the rule violated the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Colorado 
Constitution.163 After Cowles filed the complaint, the Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel notified him that it would suspend its investigation 
pending resolution of Cowles's constitutional claims.164 The Grievance 
Committee defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss based 
on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted.165 
The state trial court denied the Grievance Committee defendants' 
motion, finding that "subject matter jurisdiction to address the con-
stitutionality of a Disciplinary Rule promulgated by the Colorado 
Supreme Court is not precluded by statute, rule, or case law."166 The 
Grievance Committee defendants then filed a petition for writ of 
prohibition and rule to show cause in the state supreme court assert-
ing that the respondent trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over the complaint and erroneously denied their motion to dismiss the 
action.167 On April 19, 1993, the Supreme Court of Colorado concluded 
that a state trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to 
determine the constitutionality of a disciplinary rule while a discipli-
nary proceeding is pending against the attorney who alleges that the 
disciplinary rule is unconstitutional.168 
[wle are talking about toilet training trans-national corporations; that's what our 
lawsuit is about. We don't want our lands polluted, our water made unsafe to drink and 
our air a cause of sickness and disease. Rich corporations who violate our citizens and 
our environment must be punished and they shall be. 
ASARCO Hit with Class Action Lawsuit, supra note 1, at 1. 
161 Complaint at 5, Cowles (No. 92-CV-0984). 
162 [d. at 1-7. 
163 [d. at 7. 
164 Colorado Sup. Ct. Grievance Comm. v. District Ct., 850 P.2d 150, 151 (Colo. 1993) (en banc). 
165 Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 1, Cowles v. Colorado Sup. Ct. 
Grievance Comm., No. 92-CV-0984 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 29,1992). 
166 Colorado Sup. Ct. Grievance Comm., 850 P.2d at 151. 
167 Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Rule to Show Cause at 3, Colorado Sup. Ct. Grievance 
Comm. v. District. Ct., 850 P.2d 150 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) (No. 92-SA-437). 
163 Colorado Sup. Ct. Grievance Comm., 850 P.2d at 154. 
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Approximately one month before the Colorado Supreme Court de-
cided the case filed by Cowles, a jury, following a six-week trial, 
returned verdicts in Escamilla v. Asarco, Inc. 169 in favor of the plain-
tiff class.170 Also before the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, 
the Colorado legislature adopted the Colorado Rules of Professional 
Conduct to supersede and replace the Colorado Code of Professional 
Responsibility.171 The grievance against Cowles was subsequently dis-
missed.172 
2. A Method of Intimidation 
The action against Cowles "smelled like a hybrid"173 of a SLAPP 
suit-a suit brought essentially in retaliation for any activity adverse 
to the business interest of the industrial plaintiff.174 Although SLAPP 
suits rarely succeed,175 the knowledge that such a complaint could be 
filed intimidates environmental plaintiffs.176 Environmental poverty 
lawyers and their clients are daunted by the mere threat of a costly 
SLAPP suit or DR 7-107(G) claim.177 
Intimidation in environmental poverty lawyering is a common tac-
tic.178 The DR 7-107(G) claim against Cowles is one example of a 
method of intimidation that need not succeed on its merits to achieve 
169 No. 91-CV-5716 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 23, 1993). 
17°Id. On March 12, 1993, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $28.12 million. Some Big Judgments 
Were Settled After Trial, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 17, 1994, at S14, S14. Asarco planned to appeal, yet 
settled three months later for $35 million. Id. Of this amount, it was agreed that $14 million 
would be paid in cash and $11 million would be applied to cleaning up the property of the 
Globeville residents. Id. The remaining $10 million would be paid contingent upon Asarco 
winning a breach-of-contract lawsuit against its insurance carriers. Id. 
171 Colorado Sup. Ct. Grievance Comm., 850 P.2d at 154. 
172 Telephone Interview with Macon Cowles, supra note 152. 
173 Kevin Simpson, In Zeal to Keep Lawyers Quiet, Some People Push the Limits, DENVER 
POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at IE. 
174 David J. Abell, Comment, Exercise of Constitutional Privileges: Deterring Abuse of the 
First Amendment-"Strategic Lawsuits Against Political Participation," 47 SMU L. REV. 95, 
95-96 (1993). For a general overview of SLAPP suits, see generally George W. Pring, SLAP Ps: 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3 (1989); Thomas A. 
Waldman, Comment, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in First Amendment Law and in the Courts' 
Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979 (1992). 
175 Joseph J. Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New Approach, 28 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 105 (1988) (asserting that intimidation suits "never result in 
judgments for plaintiffs"). 
176 Interview with Charles P. Lord, supra note 5. 
177Id. 
178Id. (explaining that communities are unwilling to pursue legal action due to threats of 
physical and legal retaliation). 
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the desired goal of intimidation.179 DR 7-107(G) claims signal that 
lawyers who participate in public discussion should be prepared to 
defend their speech in the courtroom against those whose business 
interests may be adversely affected.180 Just as corporations consider 
litigation a cost of doing business, environmental poverty lawyers in 
states governed by DR 7-107(G) must assess the value of their public 
discussion against the potential risk of having a bar grievance filed 
against them. 
E. A More Lenient Standard in Civil Cases 
As noted in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, there are sub-
stantial reasons for applying a more lenient standard to attorney 
speech in civil as opposed to criminallitigation.181 First, civil cases do 
not require the high degree of insularity essential to ensure fairness 
in criminal cases.182 For example, the Sixth Amendment explicitly 
requires an "impartial jury" in criminal cases while the Seventh Amend-
ment ensures only "trial by jury" in civil cases.183 
Second, a civil case is likely to last substantially longer than a 
criminal case.l84 DR 7-107(G) does not specify a time frame in which 
the lawyer's speech is to be restricted.185 The rule broadly states that 
a lawyer's speech is restricted during the lawyer's "investigation or 
litigation."186 Accordingly, the Bauer court found the "blanket cover-
age" of DR 7-107(G) "an influential factor weighing against its consti-
tutionality."187 
Finally, the public importance of many issues involved in civil liti-
gation justifies limiting the application of restrictions on extrajudicial 
comments by attorneys in civil cases. ISS Indeed, the Bauer court noted 
179Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 257-58 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 
U.S. 912 (1976). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 258. 
184 Id. The length of a civil case can be attributed to two factors. First, civil rules generally 
allow more discovery than criminal rules. Id. Second, criminal matters receive priority over civil 
matters because of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a "speedy trial" in criminal matters. 
Id. 
185 Bauer, 522 F.2d at 258. 
186 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(G) (1983); Bauer, 522 F.2d at 
258. 
187 Bauer, 522 F.2d at 258. 
188 See, e.g., In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1979), a/I'd sub nom. Halkin v. Helms, 
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that the goal of some civil suits even may be to provide the public 
with important information.189 The court explained: 
[s]ometimes a class of poor or powerless citizens challenges, by 
way of a civil suit, actions taken by our established private or 
semi-private institutions or governmental entities. Often non-law-
yers can adequately comment publicly on behalf of these institu-
tions or governmental entities. The lawyer representing the class 
plaintiffs may be the only articulate voice for that side of the case. 
Therefore, we should be extremely skeptical about any rule that 
silences that voice. l90 
This analysis suggests DR 7-107(G) is unconstitutional not only 
because the rule fails to incorporate the constitutional standard set 
forth in Gentile v. State Bar,l9l but also because the rule should incor-
porate a more permissive standard in light of its application in civil 
suits.192 
IV. EMPOWERMENT LAWYERING USING 1994 MODEL RULE 3.6 
Although many environmental justice scholars suggest that the 
speech of the community, rather than that of the lawyer, is essential 
to environmental justice,193 this Comment suggests that once litiga-
tion has commenced, the speech of the lawyer becomes equally, if not 
more, important.l94 Battles in the environmental justice movement are 
fundamentally political and economic battles-not legal ones.195 There-
fore, environmental justice lawsuits, environmental poverty lawyer 
Luke Cole urges, "must be brought in recognition of their political 
nature, in order to lift a community's morale, strengthen the commu-
nity group, raise the profile of the group, and build the political 
690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 373 (4th Cir. 1979); Bauer, 522 
F.2d at 258. 
189 Bauer, 522 F.2d at 258. 
190 [d. But see Interview with Charles P. Lord, supra note 5 (remarking that this sentiment 
runs counter to much of what environmental justice theorists believe; environmental justice 
theorists prefer to see residents, not lawyers, speaking out on their own problems). 
191 See supra section II.B.1. 
192 See Bauer, 522 F.2d at 257-58. 
193 Cole, Empowerment, supra note 4, at 661~; Interview with Charles P. Lord, supra note 5. 
194 This Comment examines the situation in which a community group has decided to pursue 
litigation. Some environmental justice scholars have stated that "bringing a lawsuit may ensure 
loss ofthe struggle at hand, or cause significant disempowerment of the client community." Luke 
W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM DRB. 
L.J. 523, 524 (1994) [hereinafter Cole, Environmental Justice Litigationl. 
195 [d. at 541. 
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momentum necessary to win such struggles."196 Trial publicity, one of 
the political benefits of environmental justice lawsuits,197 is more per-
missible under 1994 Model Rule 3.6 than it was under the rule's 
predecessors. 1994 Model Rule 3.6, therefore, increases the benefits 
of environmental justice lawsuits while removing a weapon for pollut-
ers to use to attack those in support of environmental justice. 
A. The Importance of Trial Publicity in Environmental 
Justice Cases 
As an attorney for the plaintiff class in Escamilla v. Asarco, Inc., 
Cowles brought media attention to the struggle of the Globeville 
community against corporate giant Asarco.198 Cowles's comments to 
the press were published in national publications such as the Wall 
Street Journal and The American Lawyer.199 Cowles and members of 
the community also were featured on national news shows such as 
CNN.200 Publicity, like that Cowles generated, is important in drawing 
attention to struggles by communities faced with environmental harms 
and in building momentum for the environmental justice movement, 
especially since these communities are often dis empowered and dis-
enfranchised with respect to their corporate opponents.201 
The publicity surrounding an environmental justice case also may 
encourage other, similarly situated communities to take collective 
action.202 Seeing or hearing a similar situation recounted on television 
or in the papers, and seeing what one community has accomplished 
by fighting that situation, may encourage other communities to fight 
back as well.203 Not only will other communities join the environ-
mental justice battle, but other plaintiffs in the communities where 
the battle is being fought may be encouraged to join the class action. 
In fact, the publicity Cowles generated encouraged other plaintiffs to 
196 [d. 
197 [d. at 541-42. 
198 See, e.g., Kris Newcomer, ASARCO Settlement Set at $28 Million Juror Says Award Sends 
Message You Don't Throw 'Toxic Trash' on Ground, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 24, 1993, at 
4A; sources cited infra notes 199-200. 
199 See, e.g., Asarco is Told to Pay $28 Million in Lawsuit Over Denver Cleanup, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 27, 1993, at C13; Stewart Yerton, Counsel Switch Nets Quick Settlement, AM. LAW., 
Sept. 1993, at 28. 
200 CNN: Denver's ASARCO Smelter Blamedfor Toxic Pollution (Cable News Network, Inc. 
television broadcast, Aug. 19, 1993). 
201 See Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation, supra note 194, at 542. 
202 [d. 
203 [d. 
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join the legal battle against Asarco.204 The original suit against Asarco, 
which was filed by nine Globeville residents, later became a class-ac-
tion suit by 567 Globeville homeowners.205 
Trial publicity serves yet another purpose-political education. U s-
ing publicity, a community group can educate its members, politicians, 
and other communities.206 Publicity may aid local residents, decision-
makers, and company officials in viewing environmental problems 
differently.207 
B. Trial Publicity in Environmental Justice Cases Does Not 
Sacrifice Fair Trials 
Scant evidence exists to substantiate allegations that trial publicity 
unjustly prejudices a jury or that extrajudicial comment by attorneys 
causes a more considerable threat to impartiality than other com-
ment.208 Environmental poverty lawyers, therefore, should be able to 
comment on matters under litigation, subject to the limited restric-
tions of 1994 Model Rule 3.6. 
Safeguards already exist to prevent juror partiality. First, fraudu-
lent, sensational, or unethical extrajudicial statements rarely bias 
jurors.209 Jurors tend to mistrust reporters and believe that their 
involvement as jurors gives them a better understanding than the 
204 Telephone Interview with Macon Cowles, supra note 152. 
205 Globe Plant Historical Timeline (ASARCO Inc., Denver, Colo.), Winter 1994, at 1. 
206 See Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation, supra note 194, at 542. 
2Q7 See id. 
208 Panel Three: The Roles of Juries and the Press in the Modern Judicial System, 40 AM. 
U. L. REV. 597, 605 (1991) [hereinafter Panel Three] (emphasi2ing that legal system and its 
rules make unsupported assumptions about juries); see Robert E. Dreschsel, An Alternative 
View of Media-Judiciary Relations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the Fair 
Trial-Free Press Issue, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1,3 (1989) (describing prejudicial pUblicity as a 
"small problem"); John Kaplan, Of Babies and Bathwater, 29 STAN. L. REV. 621, 623 (1977) 
(concluding that newspaper publicity and out-of-court statements have "virtually no impact" on 
jurors); Joseph F. Kobylka & David M. Dehnel, Toward a Structuralist Understanding of First 
and Sixth Amendment Guarantees, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 363, 364 (1986) (asserting that 
pretrial publicity may help, as well as harm, a defendant's case); Geoffrey P. Kramer et al., 
Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 414 (1990) 
(concluding that knowledge of actual effect of publicity on jurors is "fragmentary"); Joel H. 
Swift, Model Rule 3.6: An Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense Attorney Trial Publicity, 
64 B.U. L. REV. 1003,1006 (1984) [hereinafter Swift, Model Rule 3.6] (alleging that "no empirical 
evidence exists" to establish cause and effect relationship between attorney-generated publicity 
and juror partiality); Joel H. Swift, Restraints on Defense Publicity in Criminal Jury Cases, 
1984 UTAH L. REV. 45, 92 (1984) (stating that extensive publicity and divulgence of prejudicial 
information do not "inevitably destroy a fair trial"). 
209 Kaplan, supra note 208, at 623. 
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press.210 One legal professional commented that his own personal ex-
perience indicated that jurors distrust lawyers that attempt to sen-
sationalize a case or act.211 
Second, jurors in civil cases are instructed to evaluate a case solely 
on the evidence presented.212 Behavioral scientist Rita Simon studied 
the influence of pretrial publicity on a defendant's right to a fair trial 
by jury.213 Simon concluded that juries in the aggregate are "respon-
sible and rational."214 Jurors take their role seriously and recognize 
that they must follow the rules and procedures of the court.215 More-
over, criticism of jurors for capricious and emotional verdicts remains 
unsubstantiated.216 A phone survey Simon conducted before voir dire 
of a trial revealed that jurors were affected by publicity but fifty-nine 
percent of those polled claimed that they could ignore the publicity 
and focus on the evidence presented in COurt.217 
C. The Importance of Attorney Speech 
It is important for environmental poverty lawyers to speak out 
about public matters, such as the pollution problem in Globeville, 
because attorney speech empowers the community. Attorney com-
ment provides critical information the public can use to regulate the 
conduct of industry and other polluters and to suggest changes.218 
210 Id.; see Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass 
Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 656, 659 (1991) (declaring that jurors, when well-informed, are 
not overly influenced by media attention; they are, in fact, "skeptical about information from 
the media"). 
211 Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Thctics Against Legal Ethics, 
17 PEpP. L. REV. 637, 649 (1990). 
212 Interview with Margaret R. Hinkle, Associate Justice of the Superior Court of Massachu-
setts, in Boston, Mass. (Apr. 5, 1995); cf. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN 
JURY 494 (1966) (explaining that juries in criminal cases focus on evidence presented and 
understand obligation to render guilty verdict only when evidence proves guilt beyond reason-
able doubt). 
213 Rita J. Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research 
Evidence on the Impact on Juror's of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 515, 520 (1977). 
214Id. 
215Id. 
216 Id.; see Panel Three, supra note 208, at 602 (avowing that jurors are capable of analyzing 
evidence and charges and reaching a just conclusion). 
217 Simon, supra note 213, at 526-27; see Kramer et al., supra note 208, at 413 (asserting that 
exposure to publicity does not preclude impartiality). 
218 Cf. Anthony Lewis, Keynote Address: The Right to Scrutinize Government: Toward a 
First Amendment Theory of Accountability, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 793, 796-97 (1980) (arguing 
that complexity and size of our government requires greater scrutiny to detect and stop abuse); 
Vermont Royster, The Free Press and a Fair Trial, 43 N.C. L. REV. 364, 364 (1965) (explaining 
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Freedom to speak and to gather information through the speech of 
others ensures the proper administration of justice.219 Without free 
speech, not only does the attorney as a citizen lose fundamental First 
Amendment rights,220 but the public also loses an informed voice.221 
The press may report trial details, but lawyers are necessary to 
explain the significance of those details and to discover reporting 
inconsistencies.222 Furthermore, attorney involvement in lawsuits ex-
hibits an interest in and familiarity with the underlying problem. 
Thus, attorneys represent informed viewpoints.223 Absence of attor-
that unrestrained access to and comment on judicial proceedings deters arbitrary government 
acts against public); Rene L. Todd, Note, A Prior Restraint by Any Other Name: The Judicial 
Response to Media Challenges of Gag Orders Directed at Trial Participants, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
1171,1207 (1990) (concluding that overbroad restraints on information sources subverts society's 
ability to check judicial integrity). 
219 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 
reprinted in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, A COLLECTION OF BEST WRITINGS 63, 75 (Kent 
Middleton & Roy M. Mersky eds., 1981) (arguing that First Amendment rights should be 
unqualified because ensuring proper administration of justice requires that members of society: 
(1) comprehend national problems; (2) judge decisions made by government officials; and (3) 
share in decisionmaking process to ensure best decisions are made and effectuated). But see 
MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 46, 205 (1984) (criticiz-
ing Meiklejohn's theory). 
220 Attorneys are citizens with the First Amendment right to speak. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 
F.2d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 1979); Royster, supra note 218, at 366. William Blackstone declared that 
every man possessed the right to "lay what sentiments he pleases in the public forum." Royster, 
supra note 218, at 366 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-*52). Royster 
added that if every man possessed this right then it should not be a privilege for some and 
denied to others. [d. "[N]othing that abridges the right for any man--even a muddleheaded 
editor-abridges the right for all men." [d. But see Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 366 (adding that First 
Amendment rights for members of the bar include certain responsibilities; guidelines must be 
established to ensure responsible use of speech rights). 
221 See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 259 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 
U.S. 912 (1976) (declaring that DR 7-107 conflicts with the "very purpose of the First Amend-
ment"); Monroe H. Freedman & Janet Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of Expression 
by Defendants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum, 29 STAN. L. REV. 
607, 616 (1977) (explaining that attorneys have First Amendment rights that are vital to 
society's information-gathering process). 
222 See Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250 (stating that lawyers are one of most valuable sources of 
information because they are perceived as credible and knowledgeable); Max D. Stern, The 
Right of the Accused to a Public Defense, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53, 112 (1983) (explaining 
that attorneys are in best position to "explain the proceedings, and articulate the defense 
perspective"); Swift, Model Rule 3.6, supra note 208, at 1013 (asserting that attorneys are best 
source of trial information). But see Jeffrey Cole & Michael 1. Spak, Defense Counsel and the 
First Amendment: "A Time to Keep Silence, and a Time to Speak," 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 347, 377 
(1974) (alleging that because attorneys are most knowledgeable and influential sources of 
information, their comments unduly influence the public and should be silenced, and that no 
harm would result because many other voices remain). 
223 Bauer, 522 F.2d at 258. 
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ney comment in environmental justice cases leaves, as the only source 
of information,224 uninformed media speculation and misinterpreta-
tion, based in part, on information disseminated by the public rela-
tions firm of the defendant.225 
D. How 1994 Model Rule 3.6 Can Aid Environmental Justice 
Prior to the 1994 amendment to Model Rule 3.6, attorneys-the 
public's most knowledgeable source regarding trials-were forced to 
be silent or risk sanctions.226 The amended rule gives attorneys more 
freedom to speak out. Most importantly, 1994 Model Rule 3.6 adds a 
new "safe harbor" provision that permits lawyers to make statements 
for the purpose of guarding against undue prejudice due to recent 
publicity initiated by someone else.227 This new provision can aid the 
environmental justice movement by allowing environmental poverty 
attorneys to combat prejudicial publicity. While the defendant's public 
relations firm is at work to shape the perception of the public and that 
of policymakers about the defendant and its environmental problem, 
the plaintiff's attorney must work with community groups to ensure 
justice. 
224 Although environmental poverty attorneys ideally work in conjunction with community 
groups, there is still a question as to whether an attorney who gives information that is 
prohibited by DR 7-107(G) to community groups could be in violation of DR 7-107(G). 
225 See Patricia A. Sallen, Comment, Gag Me With a Rule-Arizona Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Rule 3.6 (1985), 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 115, 135 (1987) (stating that silencing attorneys 
deprives media of its most knowledgeable source and limits public's opportunity to scrutinize 
judicial processes); see also Nancy Blodgett, Equal Access Report: Let the Defense Tell Its 
Story, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1987, at 29 (alleging that if attorney speech is restricted, wealthier 
defendants may seek assistance of consultants or public relations firms which disadvantages 
indigent persons and permits restrictions of free speech according to wealth). 
226 See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 259 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating that 
disciplinary rules remove "[a]n informed viewpoint ... from the public forum without justifica-
tion" in violation of the First Amendment), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.02 [B], at 1-13 (1984) (cautioning that people 
are backbone of democracy and must be enlightened "by those who are informed" to ensure 
proper administration of justice); Freedman & Starwood, supra note 221, at 613 (arguing that 
press is necessary to protect against abuse of judicial system and will not be able to fulfill that 
goal if most knowledgeable sources of information are "silenced at the very moment at which 
they have the greatest incentive to protest"); Lewis, supra note 218, at 797 (explaining that 
right to scrutinize government action is necessary to exercising First Amendment rights 
because public debate must be informed). 
227 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(c) (1994). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Publicity generated by environmental poverty attorneys has the 
potential to enable the communities they represent, which are long 
overburdened by uses no other areas would tolerate, from escaping 
that particular part of their past and from realizing their vision for a 
better future.228 Attorney comment alone, however, is not the panacea 
for the environmental injustice that plagues many low-income com-
munities and communities of color. Attorney comment must inspire 
others to take action and fight those that violate our citizens and our 
environment. 
Although attorney comment is still somewhat limited under the 
current Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA has made 
enormous strides in protecting First Amendment rights while not 
sacrificing fair trials. Environmental poverty attorneys must take the 
next step and speak out. As the United States Supreme Court stated 
in Whitney v. California, the "freedom to think as you will and to 
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth."229 
228 See Lord & Shutkin, supra note 2, at 5. 
229 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
